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Sino-Latin American Relations: 
 
Retrospect and Prospects*
 
Jiang Shixue**
 
I.  Introduction 
In discussing Sino-Latin American relations, we should keep the following ten points in mind1:  
 
1) While some of the intellectuals in China are debating about what the mainstream of the 
current age is, many say that it is composed of two parts, namely, peace and development. 
Therefore, according to them, China’s foreign diplomacy needs to focus on this mainstream. 
 
2) The bi-polar world system has disappeared with the ending of the cold war. The post-cold 
war era is characterized by what many Chinese scholars describe as 
“one-superpower-and-four-strongs”. The four “strongs” are Russia, European Union, Japan and 
China.  
 
3) Despite its rapid growth of the economy, China still belongs to the developing world. So it 
always attaches great importance to the development of its relations with other Third World 
countries and has to defend the interests of the Third World and calls for the establishment of a 
new economic and political order.  
 
4) Ever since the reforms started at the end of the 1970s, China’s economic development has 
been the priority for the government and the Communist Party of China (CPC), and diplomacy 
                                                        
* Paper presented at Research Center on Development and International Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark, Spring 2001. 
** Visiting Professor at Research Center on Development and International Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark, Spring 
2001. Professor and Deputy Director at the Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
1 Throughout this paper, China means the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan is a province of PRC. 
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is intended to serve this objective.   
 
5) Economic relations are important for the development of political relations. To diversify its 
external economic relations, China has been attempting to open up the Latin American market 
and seeking more investment opportunities. 
 
6) China is the largest developing country whereas the United States is the largest developed 
one. Both have common and conflicting interests during and after the cold war era.  That is to 
say, each needs the other badly in some areas; but at the same time each disagrees with the other 
in many respects. Moreover, Sino-Latin American relations are frequently influenced by the 
movement of Sino-U.S. relations. 
 
7) The Taiwan issue has not been resolved yet. As a matter of fact, with time passing by, this 
issue has become all the more conspicuous in China’s foreign diplomacy. Regarding 
sovereignty, the Chinese government would not take any backward steps. However, there are 
still twenty-nine countries that have “diplomatic relations” with Taiwan, and fourteen of them 
are found in Latin America.  
 
II. Retrospect and Prospects of China’s Foreign Policies 
When the People’s Republic of China was founded on October 1 1949, the West, led by the 
United States, attempted fiercely to isolate the new socialist nation. Therefore, China’s most 
pressing task was to break through this isolation by seeking assistance from the developing 
countries, including Latin America, as well as from the former Soviet Union. Therefore, China 
should, in the words of Chairman Mao Zedong: 
 
- “Build a new stove to make meals”, meaning the new China would not recognise the 
diplomatic relations the old China built with the foreign powers and would also get rid of 
the humiliating diplomacy imposed by the imperialists before 1949; 
- “Clean the house before inviting guests”, meaning the new China would eliminate the 
 2
privileges and influence of imperialism in China; 
 
In reality, the new China’s foreign policy was “leaning towards one side”, meaning the new 
China would establish diplomatic relations mainly with the socialist and other countries 
friendly to China so as to build an international front against imperialism. 
 
Needless to say, it was a great encouragement for China that its victory of socialist revolution 
served as a driving force to the emerging national liberation movement in many parts of the 
Third World. China adopted a policy of sincere support for this movement in many ways. 
 
In the 1950s, China made at least two remarkable achievements in its foreign diplomacy: the 
announcement of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and participation in the 
Asia-African Conference in Bandung. 
 
On December 31, 1953, when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai met with the visiting Indian 
delegation on border dispute, he said, “I believe that relations between China and India would 
become better. …China has set up the principles to deal with the Sino-India relations. They 
have mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual 
non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; 
and peaceful coexistence. It was recognised later on that the fifth principle could be realised 
only upon the basis of implementing the first four. 
 
These principles, later known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, were written into 
the Sino-Indian treaty regarding the border dispute signed on April 29, 1954. In the same year 
the Five Principles were written into China’s first constitution. During his visit to India and 
Burma in June 1954, Zhou reaffirmed China’s Five Principles and received positive reactions 
from the two hosts. In subsequent occasions, Chairman Mao Zedong also expressed his hopes 
that the Five Principles should expand to the diplomacy of other countries in the world. 
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In April 1955 the Asia-African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia. The significance 
of this international conference lay in the fact that no developed countries were invited. Led by 
Premier Zhou Enlai, China’s delegation played an important role in this conference which 
adopted Ten Principles based on China’s Five Principles. 
 
During the period from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, the world order was increasingly 
influenced by the hegemonic contention between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a 
large country close to one the two superpowers and eager to play a role in the world arena, 
China’s foreign policies were greatly influenced by the world situations at the time.  
 
As a result, efforts were made to develop relations with the developing countries in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America. Many agreements of economic co-operation were signed between China 
and some countries in these regions. Meantime, through dialogue and negotiations, China 
successfully settled down border disputes left over from history, with such countries as Burma, 
Nepal, Mongolia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, relations with European countries and 
Japan were starting to move forward in a positive way.  
 
In the late 1950s, however, while China’s relations with the developing world and some of the 
western countries seemed to be moving forward, its ties with the Soviet Union started to cool 
down. The Soviet leaders had been trying hard to make China accept what were apparently 
beneficial to the Soviet leaders’ vision of the global strategy. They even attempted to persuade 
China into giving up its positions on such important issues as Taiwan and the Sino-Indian 
border dispute. China’s firm standing as well as many other factors resulted in the Soviet’s 
decision to “punish” China by withdrawing its economic and technological assistance in the 
early 1960s.2  
 
In the 1950s and 1960s China’s relations with the United States continued to be sour, 
                                                        
2 Within one month of July 1960, the Soviet leaders called back 1,390 experts and terminated 12 bilateral treaties 
and more than three hundred agreements of technological co-operation. 
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particularly after the Korean War. But the United States’ strategy to isolate socialist China failed. 
By the end of the 1960s, China had established diplomatic relations with more than 50 countries 
in the world, and it had been playing a significant role in maintaining world peace. 
Entering the 1970s, China made remarkable progress in its foreign diplomacy at least in two 
aspects. On the one hand, China regained its legitimate seat in the United Nations in October 
1971, which made it possible for China to play a more visible role in international affairs. On 
the other, U.S. President Nixon paid an official visit to China on February 21, 1972, which 
brought about a breakthrough in the Sino-US relations.  
 
The world community again noticed China’s position in the world arena when Mao Zedong put 
forward his theory of the “three worlds” in February 1974. He said to a visiting foreign 
government leader that the United States, the Soviet Union were the First World; in the middle 
were the Second World which include Japan, Europe, Australia and Canada, and the developing 
countries were the Third World. 
 
After the CPC’s third plenary session of the 11th National Congress in 1978, China 
implemented significant adjustment in many areas, including foreign diplomacy. Deng 
Xiaoping changed the tone directing people’s understanding of the major themes of the era.3 
When he met with the visiting Brazilian president J. P. Figueiredo in Beijing in May 1984, Deng 
said that there were many problems in the world and the two most conspicuous of them were 
peace and development. Later on, he expressed again his idea that the most important problem 
in the world could be summarised in just “four words”, East and West, and North and South. 
East West was related to peace, and North-South was relevant to development. 4 This definition 
has facilitated the making of China’s foreign policies in the new world situations and helps pave 
the way of further development of its relations with other countries, including the Latin 
American countries. 
                                                        
3 In an article published in 1924, Soviet leader J. Stalin considered war and revolution as the characteristics of the 
age. This ideological thinking had great influence upon China’s diplomacy before the end of the 1970s.  
4 Deng Xiaoping: Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), Vol. 3, Beijing: renmin chubanshe 
(People’s Publishing House), 1993, pp. 56-57. 
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When the Cold War ended, China started to re-consider the world order and also the necessity 
of adjusting its foreign policies. It seems that both the government and the academics had the 
vision that China could raise its position in the changed scenario of the world.5 For instance, 
Deng Xiaoping said in the early 1990s that in the emerging new world order China could be one 
of the of multi-poles, and the end of the Cold War could be a good opportunity for both China 
and the world.  
 
Generally speaking, most of the Chinese people, particularly the academics, believe that 
China’s foreign diplomacy towards the new century should be based upon three pillars:6
 
First, development is and will continue to be a dominant issue. As Deng Xiaoping said 
repeatedly, China should do its own things better. Indeed, only by maintaining rapid economic 
growth can China play an important role in the world. 
 
Second, defending sovereignty is still on the top agenda of China’s foreign diplomacy. China 
has 15 neighbours that directly touch its borders. China’s border disputes with a few countries 
are yet to be resolved. Around China there are several “hot” spots. Japan is developing its 
military ties with the United States.7 And even inside China, separatist forces, supported by 
some foreign countries, are found in Taiwan, Tibet and even Xinjiang.  
 
Finally, as a socialist country with 1) long history of rich civilization and cultures, 2) more than 
                                                        
5  Undoubtedly, some Chinese scholars have had different opinions regarding the prospects of peace and 
development in the world. For instance, one scholar argued that NATO’s bombings against Kosovo had signified 
the end of the opportunities offered by peace and development. (See Zhang Wenmu: kesuowo zhanzheng yu 
zhongguo de jiyu (The Kosovo War and the Security Strategy for China in the New Century), zhanglue yu guanli 
(Strategy and Management), No. 6, 1999. 
6 Wang Yizhou: mianxiang 21 shiji de zhongguo waijiao: 3 zhong xuqiu de xunqiu jiqi pingheng (Seeking and 
Balancing the Three Requirements: China’s Diplomacy towards the 21st Century), zhanglue yu guanli (Strategy 
and Management), No. 6, 1999. 
7 China has fresh memories of what Japan did in the past. But Japan has become one of the major economic powers. 
As the leaders of both governments have maintained, the two “close neighbors separated only by a strip of 
water”should walk towards the future of peace.  
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1.2 billion people, 3) nuclear weapons and long-range missiles and 4) a seat of permanent 
member in the Security Council of the UN,8 China should play an important role in the world 
arena. In the words of a scholar, “China should make great contributions to the world,… and, 
the complexity of the [current] world politics and the connotation of progress of the time all 
require China to gradually strengthen its self-consciousness of acting like a big country.”9
 
But how to act like a “big country”? Some Chinese scholars are suggesting that China would 
not escape from this pattern that, in history, any country wishing to become a world power 
started to grow out of its own region. Therefore, China should be able to play an important role 
in the regional affairs of Asia-Pacific.10   
 
III. Sino-Latin American Relations: A Historical Overview  
As early as in 1761, a French Sinologist called J. De Giognes proposed that the New World was 
not discovered by Columbus, but by the Chinese. Long debates had ensued, but there is still no 
consensus on this historical issue. Interest seemed to have waved on this issue in the West. 
However, some Chinese scholars started to be interested in it and utilised classical Chinese 
writings and even some archaeological findings to support their argument. As early as in the 5th 
century a Chinese monk (or master) named Hui Sen arrived in what is called Mexico, then 
called Fu-sang in Chinese. Needless to say, many more Chinese historians said that it was 
totally nonsense.11
 
                                                        
8China’s veto on a 1996 UN resolution to send a peace-keeping mission to Guatemala, the third veto ever used 
since it reentered the U. N. In the early 1970s, taught a lesson to those countries that tried to intervene in China’s 
internal affairs. China took back its veto on this UN resolution in early 1997, after talks were held between China 
and Guatemala.  
9 Wang Yizhou: mianxiang 21 shiji de zhongguo waijiao: 3 zhong xuqiu de xunqiu jiqi pingheng (Seeking and 
Balancing the Three Requirements: China’s Diplomacy towards the 21st Century), zhanglue yu guanli (Strategy 
and Management), No. 6, 1999, p. 26. (Apparently, the term ‘big country” here simply means a world power.) 
10 See, for example, Ye Zicheng: zhongguo shixin daguo zhanlue shizaobixin (The Inevitability of China’s Foreign 
Diplomacy as a World Power), shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), No. 1, 2000. 
11 The late Beijing University professor Luo Rongqu gave a systematic account of the debate in an article 
published in 1962. He himself disbelieved the “discovery.” 
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No matter who first landed on the Americas, proven contacts between China and Latin America 
could be dated back to the 1570s when Sino-Latin American trade started to flourish across the 
Pacific. China exported silk, porcelain and cotton yarn via Manila, to Mexico and Peru, in 
exchange for silver coins and other things. In the middle of the nineteenth century peasants 
from the southern part of China went to South America and the Caribbean as “contract 
workers” working in mines and plantations.  
 
After the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, Mexico, Argentina, Chile and a few 
other Latin American countries made contact with China for possible diplomatic relations. 
Because of many factors, their efforts did not bear fruit.  
 
Also in the 1950s, however, some Latin American countries simply followed the United States 
in an attempt to isolate China. For instance, in January 1950, before the UN Security Council 
was about to vote on the Soviet proposal that Taiwan’s seat in the UN should be replaced by the 
People’s Republic of China, the United States learned that Ecuador was planning to cut its 
relations with Taiwan. The US told the Foreign Ministry of Ecuador that, although Ecuador had 
its own independent right to make any international political decisions, severing the relations 
with Taiwan would be of great influence upon the outcome of the vote in the Security Council. 
With the pressures from the United States, the Ecuadorian representative to the UN, Homero 
Viteri-Lafronte, told the U.S. vice representative to the UN, Ernest A. Gross, that Ecuador’s 
vote had limited impact upon its own, but would have great significance for the United States. 
Therefore, for the interests of the United States, said Viteri-Lafronte, Ecuador would follow the 
United States’ wish and would not do anything that had the risks of damaging the U.S. interests. 
Guarding against further possibilities that other Latin American countries would terminate their 
relations with Taiwan, the United States issued a letter on February 1 of the same year to the 
Latin American embassies to Washington, saying that countries of the Americas should do their 
best to make concerted foreign policies.12  
                                                        
12 FRUS, Vol. 2, 1950. Quoted from Tao Wenzhao: meiguo, laiyi yu zhongguo zai lianheguo de daibiaoquan (The 
United States, Trygve Lie, and China’s Representation in the UN), meiguo yanjiu (American Studies), No. 4, 1996. 
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Fidel Castro’s victory in 1959 attracted immediate moral and political support from China. As a 
matter of fact, Cuba was the first Latin American country to recognise the new China.13 In 
September 1960, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai told Castro, “If necessary, China would furnish 
all necessary assistance to the Cuban people fighting for freedom.”14 In April 1961, U.S. 
President Kennedy, who was then seen by the American public as “inexperienced in foreign 
affairs”, approved an exile invasion of Cuba. The Chinese government made an official 
statement denouncing the American action with strong wording. Throughout the whole country, 
public rallies were held to voice support for the Cuban people standing against U.S. 
imperialism. As a matter of fact, before disputes gradually erupted between the two socialist 
countries in the mid-1960s, China and Cuba signed several agreements of economic 
co-operation. 15
 
In the 1960s China also voiced support for other Latin American countries struggling against 
the United States. For instance, when the demonstration calling for the return of the Panama 
Canal was suppressed by the U.S. army in January 1964, leading to 22 deaths, Chairman Mao 
Zedong immediately expressed his anger. “The Chinese people always stand on the side of the 
Panamanian people, fully supporting their fight against the American aggressors and their just 
struggle taking back the Panama Canal.”16 When the United States used force to intervene in 
                                                        
13 It is reported that, in a rally held in Havana on September 2, Castro asked the audience: “The Revolutionary 
Government of Cuba would like to ask the Cuban people if you would like Cuba to establish diplomatic relations 
with the People’s Republic of China?” The rally burst out, raising their hands and saying, “Yes, yes!” Then, 
walking towards the nearby head of the New China News Agency stationed in Havana, Castro said, “Here is the 
Chinese representative. From now on, I declare that Cuba cut its relations with the puppet regime of Chiang 
Kai-shek (in Taiwan).” For a more vivid account of the scene, see Wang Taiping (ed.): xin zhongguo waijiao 50 
nian (50 Years of the New China’s Foreign Diplomacy), Beijing: beijing chubanshe (Beijing Publishing House), 
1999, pp. 1636-1637. 
14Quoted from Zhang Guang: zhongguo de waijiao zhengce (China’s Foreign Policies), Beijing: shijie zhishi 
chubanshe (World Affairs Press), 1995, p. 91. 
15 Sino-Cuban relations turned for the worse in the mid-1960s for both political and economic reasons. Politically, 
it was related to the Sino-Soviet rupture, and Cuba was apparently standing on the side of the Soviet Union. 
Economically, Cuba was complaining that China did not provide enough economic assistance. Comparatively 
speaking, the political factor is more important than the economic in this regard. 
16 Quoted from Zhang Guang: zhongguo de waijiao zhengce (China’s Foreign Policies), Beijing: shijie zhishi 
chubanshe (World Affairs Press), 1995, p. 91. 
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the Dominican Republic’s internal political instability in April 1965, Chairman Mao made a 
statement of similar wording denouncing the U.S. action. 
 
Despite the “Cultural Revolution” that caused great disaster to China’s political, economic and 
social development as well as to its relations with other countries, China’s foreign diplomacy 
did make some progress in certain areas. On December 15 1970, for instance, Chile and China 
established diplomatic relations. As a matter of fact, Chile was the first South American country 
to recognise China. After U.S. President Nixon made his historical visit to China in 1972, many 
Latin American countries started to change their attitudes towards China and even expressed 
their interest in developing relations with it. Therefore, as the following table shows, the 1970s 
witnessed more than 10 Latin American countries setting up diplomatic relations with China. 
 
While many Latin American countries supported China’s re-entry into the United Nations in 
1971, China used many occasions to voice its assistance to Latin America’s call for the 
establishment of a new world order. For example, when the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai gave a 
banquet to the visiting Mexican President Echeverria on April 20, 1972, he said, “Latin 
America is emerging on the world stage with a new face. …The struggle of defending the 
maritime sovereignty of 200 nautical miles limits led by Latin American countries has inspired 
and pushed forward the people around the world to wage a struggle against maritime 
imperialism. …The Chinese government and the Chinese people firmly support the just 
struggle of the Latin American people, and believe that a united Latin America, through its 
struggle, will win a greater victory over the expansionary influence of imperialism, new and old 
colonialism.” 17  In the early 1970s, China also supported Latin America’s call for the 
establishment of a nuclear free continent. 
 
 
                                                        
17 Wang Taiping (ed.): xin zhongguo waijiao 50 nian (50 Years of the New China’s Foreign Diplomacy), Beijing: 
beijing chubanshe (Beijing Publishing House), 1999, p. 1660. 
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Table 1    Date of Establishing Diplomatic Relations  
                between China and Latin American Countries  
 
Countries Date of Establishing  
Diplomatic Relations 
Cuba     1960.9.28 
Chile     1970.12.15 
Peru     1971.11.2 
Mexico    1972.2.14 
Argentina     1972.2.19 
Guyana    1972.6.27 
Jamaica     1972.11.21 
Trinidad and Tobago    1974.6.20 
Venezuela    1974.6.28 
Brazil    1974.8.15 
Suriname    1976.5.28 
Barbados    1977.5.30 
Ecuador     1980.1.2 
Colombia     1980.2.7 
Antigua and Barbuda    1983.1.1 
Bolivia    1985.7.9 
Grenada    1985.10.1 – 1989.7.19 * 
Nicaragua    1985.12.7 - 1990.11.6 * 
Belize    1987.2.6 – 1989.10.23 * 
Uruguay    1988.12.3 
The Bahamas    1997.5.23 
St. Lucia    1997.9.1 
Note: When Belize, Grenada and Nicaragua established “diplomatic relations” with Taiwan, 
the People’s Republic of China severed its ties with the three countries. 
 
IV. Sino-Latin American Relations towards the New Century 
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As mentioned earlier, China’s reforms and opening to the outside world since 1978 has 
provided the country with a good opportunity to develop foreign diplomacy. Since then 
Sino-Latin American relations have been moving forward steadily. As of writing this paper, 
China has set up diplomatic relations with nineteen Latin American countries. 
 
As a socialist country, the Communist Party of China (CPC) always plays a decisive role in the 
nation’s foreign policy-making. It should be recognised that, during the “Cultural Revolution”, 
the CPC also made some mistakes in designing and implementing the nation’s foreign policies. 
At that time the CPC believed that the major themes of the era was war and revolution, and, if 
revolution could not stop a war, the war will stop revolution. Now the CPC’s policies of 
developing relations with foreign parties are based on the four principles: autonomy; fully 
equality; mutual respect; and mutual non-interference. It seems that the following 
characteristics can be summarised from the CPC’s relations with the Latin American political 
parities: 18
 
First, the CPC seeks ties with not only the ruling parties, but also the opposition parties. In 
Argentina, for instance, before the election in 1983, many people believed that the Radical 
Party would not win. But the CPC still invited the party’s leader Raul Alfonsin to visit China. 
Having gained the presidency with 52% of the vote, the grateful president sent a large 
delegation to visit China, apparently in appreciation of China’s earlier invitation. On China’s 
side, the CPC continued to maintain relations with the Peronist Party, whose leader Carlos Saul 
Menem won the presidential elections of May 1989. In November 1989, only five months after 
the June 4 incident, President Menem sent his brother, Senate President Eduardo Menem, to 
visit Beijing at a time when the West was sanctioning against China. The Argentine guest even 
invited Chinese President Jiang Zemin to visit Bueno Aires in May 1990. In November 1990 
President Menem became the first Latin American head of State to visit China after the June 4 
                                                        
18 Huang Wendeng: Dengxiaoping lilun yu zhongla dangji guanxi (Deng Xiaoping theory and the party relations 
between the Communist Party of China and the Latin American Political Parties), in ladingmeizhou yanjiu (Latin 
American Studies), No. 6, 1998, pp. 1-7. 
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Tienamer incident. 
 
Second, by taking advantage of the “party diplomacy”, the CPC developed relations with the 
parties in the countries that have not established diplomatic relations. This is particularly 
meaningful in the case of Bolivia and Uruguay. Since before China established formal 
diplomatic relations with these two Latin American countries, the CPC had good contacts with 
the political parties there.  
 
So far the CPC has established relations with various political parties in the majority of the 
Latin American countries that have no diplomatic ties with China. For instance, it has good 
contacts with the major parties in Paraguay; the only South American country that has 
recognises Taiwan. It is reported that these parties have reached a consensus that the 
government should improve the relationship between China and Paraguay.  
 
Third, the CPC seeks to develop party relations so as to draw lessons and experiences from the 
Latin American process of developing the economy as well as governing the country. The CPC 
also helps both sides to create opportunities of economic co-operation. For instance, returning 
from a visit to Brazil and Uruguay in June 1996, a CPC delegation of high level succeeded in 
helping a Chinese company in Shenzhen to sell telecommunication equipment to these two 
South American countries. Even the CPC’s Department of International Liaison introduced a 
Chinese investor to build a clothing-making factory in Honduras after a party delegation from 
the Central American country asked China to make investment there when it was visiting China 
in 1991. 
 
China has also made efforts to develop relations with the multilateral and regional organisations 
in Latin America. For instance, since the establishment of the political dialogue relations 
between China and the Rio Group in 1990, nine foreign ministerial-level talks have been 
conducted. China has always praised the important role of the Rio Group and considered it as an 
important political force among developing countries and a reliable partner of China in 
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international affairs. In June 1994,China became the first Asian country to be an observer to the 
Latin American Integration Association. In May 1997, China was admitted into the Caribbean 
Development Bank, and in September 1993 China made the official application to join in the 
Inter-American Development Bank.  MERCOSUR is becoming an important integration 
organisation in the West hemisphere. China has established the dialogue mechanism with it and 
two dialogues have been held.  
 
On the whole, bilateral relations between China and Latin American countries at present are on 
good terms. However, there are still rooms for improvement. As a matter of fact, Latin America, 
particularly the Central American and the Caribbean sub-regions, are weak spots for China’s 
foreign diplomacy as Taiwan has a stronghold there.19
 
It is well known that the effectiveness of the mainland China’s efforts to counter-attack 
Taiwan’s “dollar diplomacy” is often reduced by the United States.  President Clinton’s permit 
for Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States was a notable example. As for the 
Central American and the Caribbean countries, it is evident that governments in these 
sub-regions would not dare to recognise the People’s Republic of China before they get the nod 
from the U.S. government. Apparently, it is the United States’ desire to stop unified China 
standing in East Asia and it is of American national interest to maintain the status quo of the 
Taiwan Strait. 
 
Taiwan’s seemingly success in carrying out its “dollar diplomacy” is easily understood. As a 
Chinese proverb goes, “whoever has the milk can be my mother”. Lured by the generous 
economic assistance from Taiwan, some Central American and the Caribbean countries have 
repeatedly proposed in vain that the Chinese province of Taiwan be “readmitted” into the UN 
However, as many observer acknowledge, if 1.2 billion people of the mainland China do not 
agree, Taiwan’s independence will only be merely a day-dream. 
                                                        
19 Paraguay is the only South American country that has not recognized the People’s Republic of China. 
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It has been increasingly recognised that, in the age of globalization, politics tends to be framed 
with an economic logic and economic issues are often linked to politics. Indeed, to develop 
bilateral relations, it is important to expand economic ties. This point is certainly relevant to the 
Sino-Latin American relations towards the new century. 
On October 23, 1952, China and Chile signed a bilateral trade agreement, which became the 
first such agreement between China and Latin America. Indeed, Sino-Latin American trade had 
grown rapidly. By 1960, two-way trade between China and Latin America had risen to more 
than US$30 million as compared with only US$7 million in 1955. In 1970 and 1978 it 
surpassed US$100 million and US$1 billion respectively. With the rapid development of 
diplomatic relations across the Pacific since the late 1970s, Sino-Latin American trade 
increased impressively. As table 2 shows, by 2000, two-way trade between China and Latin 
America had risen to more than 12 billion US$. (As a reference, China – U.S. two way trade in 
1999 totalled 6.1 million US$.)  
 
Since the 1990s China has changed from a frequent trade deficit with Latin American countries 
to a small amount of surplus. In 1997, for instance, China enjoyed a surplus of US$837 million; 
in 1998 and 1999 it stood at US$2.3 billion. 
 
China’s exports to Latin America are mainly machinery (tractors, machine tools, engines, ships, 
hydro-electricity generators, etc), electronics (TV sets, refrigerators and other household 
apparatus), textiles, clothing, medical products and cosmetics, and light industrial products. It 
imports from Latin America such goods as iron ore and copper ore, fish meals, petroleum, wool, 
machinery, steel, edible oil, sugar, paper pulp and leather, among others. 
 
China’s major trade partners in Latin America are quite concentrated. As table 3 indicates, the 
largest five trade partners in 1999 accounted for three fourth of the whole region. 
 
It should be pointed out that Sino-Latin American trade accounts for a small share in each side’s 
 15
overall foreign trade (less than 2% for each). However, the prospect appears promising. This is 
simply because:  
 
1) Latin America is rich of natural resources and China’s rapid economic development will 
need more such input to sustain this growth;  
2) There is some economic complementarity between the two sides;  
3) As both China and Latin America have been undergoing economic reforms, markets are 
opening and investment regulations are becoming more liberal; 
4) Latin America would not afford to neglect China’s huge market potentials, particularly after 
the latte enters WTO. Moreover, in the process of diversifying its external economic 
strategy, Latin America would also need China and other East Asian countries; 
5) In the age of globalization, China and Latin America have some common interests in such 
issues as South-South co-operation. 
 
 
Table 2    Sino-Latin American Trade (million US$) 
  1950   1955   1960   1965   1970   1975 
   1.9   7.3   31.3   343.1   145.8   475.7 
 
  1980   1990   1995   1998   1999   2000 
  1331   2294   6114   8312   8260   12600 
 Source: zhonguo haiguan tongji (China Customs Statistics), various issues. 
 
 
Table 3    China’s Major Trade Partners in Latin America, 1999 (million US$) 
  Brazil     Chile  Argentina   Panama   Mexico 
  1845    1269    1086    1038     951 
 
   Peru   Cuba   Uruguay   Venezuela   Colombia 
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   441    289     213     188     125 
 Source: zhongguo haiguan tongji (China Customs Statistics). 
 
In recent years it has been increasingly recognised, by both the Chinese government and the 
academics, that Sino-Latin American economic co-operation is all the more important in so far 
as China can meet some of its resource needs from the other side of the Pacific. It is true that 
China is a nation with great amount of natural resources. Because of its huge population, 
however, China is also lacking resources in terms of per capita shares. Take forest and timber 
for example. According to recent statistics, China’s forest area is 1.2 million square kilometres 
and timber resource is about 10 billion cubic meters. These two absolute numbers are huge 
compared to many other countries in the world. But in per capita terms China’s forest area is 
merely 0.10 hector and timber resource is less than 10 cubic meters as compared with the world 
average level of 1.07 hector and 83 cubic meters respectively.20  
 
It is reported that, throughout the whole China before 1998, 230 million cubic meters of timber 
were cut down each year, causing wide range of soil erosion and floods. Needless to say, to 
import timber from Latin America or other parts of the world has strategic significance for 
China.  
 
However, further development of Sino-Latin American economic relations is facing two major 
obstacles:  
 
First of all, the geographical distance between the two sides is certainly an unfavourable factor. 
So far there is no direct air links between China and any Latin American country, and long 
distance, weather and some man-made factors affect the limited maritime routes. As a result, 
delays are very common.  
 
                                                        
20 Guo Yuanzheng： lizuo kechixu fanzhan, jiakuai kaituo lamei ziyuan shichang (Quciken up pace to open up the 
market of natural resources on the base of sustainable development), ladingmeizhou yanjiu (Latin American 
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Second, exchanges of market information are difficult and mutual understanding is lacking. 
This is due not only to the geographical distance but also to languages, cultures, custom, etc.  
 
These two obstacles have existed for a long time. In recent years, Latin American use of 
anti-dumping seems to have created another hurdle to the development of Sino-Latin American 
economic relations. On April 15, 1993, Mexico decided to levy anti-dumping tariffs on ten 
categories of imports from China. This was the first action in Latin America ever to limit 
Chinese exports. Since then Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela have 
all undertaken this trade practice against China.  
 
Several features of Latin America’s anti-dumping can be found. First, this practice covers a 
wide range of Chinese products in some countries. Second, the anti-dumping tariffs are very 
high.  In the case of Mexico, it once levied 1105% on Chinese shoes. This rate was equal to a 
total ban on Chinese shoes. Finally, some Latin American countries never rely on international 
norms. That is to say, they tend to levy the taxes even before making a real investigation.  
 
As a matter of fact, to expand its market share in Latin America is also China’s objective to 
reduce dependence upon the United States, Japan and Europe. Therefore, China has been trying 
very hard to find ways and means to increase economic relations with Latin America. One most 
recent measure has been called “processing with our own materials”, meaning that China would 
ship the production lines and intermediate goods to Latin America instead of selling the final 
products. This idea seems feasible, as, in the case of TV sets production, China’s own capacity 
is showing signs of exceeding the domestic market needs.  
 
It has been frequently suggested that both China and Latin America should think of more 
effective ways to sustain the momentum of economic co-operation that has been going on in the 
past several decades. One of such ways seems to lie in the possibility that each makes more 
foreign direct investment in the other’s economy.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Studies), No. 1, 1999, p. 18.  
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By the end of 1998 China had made 246 investments in Latin America, with a total amount of 
around US$290 million. Major investments include such projects as an iron ore mine in Peru, 
oil fields in Mexico and Peru, agriculture and textiles in Mexico, timber in Brazil, fish meals 
and timber products in Chile, fishery and TV sets in Argentina, motorcycles in Colombia, 
shrimp raising in Ecuador and gas production in Venezuela and Peru. By the same time, there 
were 77 Latin American investment projects in China totaling US$8.3 billion.21
 
Another way to promote Sino-Latin American co-operation is in the field of science and 
technology. In this regard, China and Brazil might have served as a good example. A satellite 
has been sent into orbit jointly by the two nations. It is reported that a second launching is 
planned for the near future. Finally, given the huge labour powers and growing infrastructures 
needs, construction contracts may be another area of co-operation.  
 
In discussing economic co-operation between China and Latin America, we should not fail to 
mention the regional economic integration movement in Latin America. The resurgence of this 
movement and the birth of such organisation as MERCOSUR, would mean both opportunities 
and challenges for China. On the positive side, it is likely that some Chinese enterprises with 
strong competitiveness might take advantage of the free movement of goods and capital among 
the Latin American countries. On the negative side, however, there is trade diversion, which is 
not favourable to China and other Asian countries.  
 
However, it is important to quote what Deng Xiaoping said in 1988: “People are saying that the 
21st century is the Pacific era…. I firmly believe that at that time there will also be a Latin 
American era, and I hope the Pacific era, Atlantic era and the Latin American era appear at the 
same time.” He also said, “China’s policy is to develop and maintain good relations with Latin 
American countries, and make Sino-Latin American relations a model of South-South 
                                                        
21 Wang Jian: zhong la jingmao guanxi xianzhuang ji qianjing (Status quo and prospects of Sino-Latin American 
trade), ladingmeizhou yanjiu (Latin American Studies), No. 2, 2000, pp. 12-13. 
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co-operation.”22
 
It is an encouraging sign that a new “bridge” has been built across the Pacific between Asia and 
Latin America. It is the East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF), first mooted by Singapore 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong during his visit to Chile in October 1998. “I conceived the 
EALAF as a multi-dimensional dialogue. It was to help break down barriers and encourage the 
evolution of more concrete links,” said Prime Minister Goh. 23 The first EALAF, attended by 
senior officials from 27 East Asian and Latin American countries,24 was held in Singapore from 
1 to 3 September 1999. The next meeting of EALAF will be at the foreign ministers’ level and it 
will take place in Chile in the first quarter of 2001. 
 
According to the Foreign Ministry of Singapore, the Forum will contribute to a stable 
international order by interconnecting two important growth areas of the world. However, the 
full potential of linking the two regions is likely to take 10 years or more, due to the lack of 
historical contact, awareness and understanding between both regions. The launch of the Forum 
will thus be the start of a long-term process to bring that synergy to fruition.25
 
China sent a high-level delegation to attend its first meeting. It is China’s belief that close 
co-operation between East Asia and Latin America would help raise the position of the 
developing countries and also facilitate the establishment of a new political and economic order. 
China also proposes that only sovereign nations can participate in the forum and it should take 
advantage of the complementarity of both regions to promote economic co-operation in the new 
century.26
                                                        
22 Quoted from the renmin ribao (People’s Daily), October 8, 1995. 
23 Quoted from http://www.mfa.gov.sg/abtspore/index.htm 
24 The 27 countries participating in EALAF are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, 
Malaysia, Laos, Indonesia, Myanmar, Japan, China, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. 
25 http://www.mfa.gov.sg/abtspore/index.htm 
26 As a token of support for the forum, China announced that the Chinese Foreign Ministry would organize a course 
for the Latin American diplomats in Beijing so as to promote mutual understanding between the diplomats of both 
sides. 
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V. China’s Relations with Cuba 
As mentioned earlier, it was through Cuba that China “entered” Latin America in the diplomatic 
fields, and the two countries did enjoy a short honeymoon. As a matter of fact, it was the Cuban 
revolution that encouraged China to take a new look at the revolutionary movements on the 
other side of the Pacific. 
 
Changes of the China-Cuban relations were greatly affected by the split between China and the 
former Soviet Union. In the early 1960s, faced with tight American embargo and sanctions, 
Cuba acquired strategic assistance from both the former USSR and China, and Cuba seemed to 
take a neutral stand towards the Sino-Soviet divide.  
 
At the end of 1964 a delegation of communist parties from nine Latin American countries, led 
by a high level Cuban official, visited both Moscow and Beijing. It urged the two large socialist 
countries to stop public arguments by briefing the Chinese leaders about the decisions made at a 
secret meeting, attended by the Latin American communist parties, in Havana in November 
1964. The Chinese leaders did not accept the pro-Soviet suggestions, and this caused discontent 
from the Cuban counterparts. 
 
On March 13, 1965, at a public rally, Castro made an implicit critique against the Chinese 
leaders and their external and internal policies. In September of the same year, Cuba denounced 
that the Chinese embassy to Havana was violating Cuba’s sovereignty by distributing printed 
materials. The sour relations between two socialist countries were worsened by the fact that 
Moscow provided Cuba with more economic aid than Beijing. Cuba was also not happy to see 
that China and the United States started to move closer in the early 1970s. Therefore, despite 
efforts made by the Chinese leaders to improve relations with the Caribbean Island nation, 
bilateral contacts remained on a very low level.27
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
27 See Wang Taiping (ed.): xin zhongguo waijiao 50 nian (50 Years of the New China’s Foreign Diplomacy), 
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The exchange of visits between Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and his Cuban 
counterpart Malmierca in 1989 marked the full resumption and development of Sino-Cuban 
relations. In 1993 Chinese leader Jiang Zemin paid a visit to Cuba, and in 1995, Cuban leader 
Fidel Castro went to China. As a matter of fact, since the early 1990s the two socialist countries 
have been co-operating closely in many international issues. China supports Cuba to defend its 
sovereignty and fight against U.S. imperialism, whereas Cuba actively backs China in its 
admission to the WTO and China's principles on human rights, Taiwan and Tibet issues. 
 
With the improvement of political relations, bilateral economic co-operation also proceeds 
smoothly. In 1999 two way trade amounted to 288 million US dollars. China imports raw sugar 
and some medicine from Cuba, and exports food, machinery, medicines and light industrial 
products. In July 1997 the first Sino-Cuban joint venture, making plastic slippers, was 
established in Cuba.  
 
It is important to point out that the present China-Cuba relations, based mainly on realistic 
co-operation with mutual understanding and benefits, are unlike those of the early 1960s, which 
were mainly built on ideology. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Since 1949 China’s foreign policies have been changing from time to time. No matter what kind 
of shifts there would be, it seems that China never forgets the importance of the Third World.  
 
Latin America is important for China at least in three areas. Politically, China needs Latin 
America and other developing regions to maintain the momentum of fighting against 
imperialism and hegemonic powers. Economically, China considers Latin America as a 
continent possessing the potentials of trade and investment opportunities and a supplier of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Beijing: beijing chubanshe (Beijing Publishing House), 1999, pp. 
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natural resources. In the field of foreign diplomacy, the mainland China finds Latin America a 
place where it should contain Taiwan’s “dollar diplomacy.” 
 
It is expected that in the new century the above three aspects will still dominate China’s policies 
towards Latin America, and Sino-Latin American relations will continue to develop on the 
basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 
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